

## THE MUEDA CASE AND MACONDE POLITICAL ETHNICITY SOME NOTES ON A WORK IN PROGRESS\*

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Before the studies by Yussuf Adam, Hilário Alumasse Dyuti and João Paulo Borges Coelho, published in the Mozambican journal *Arquivo*, a special issue on Cabo Delgado<sup>1</sup>, the sole source about the Mueda case was the testimony by Joaquim Alberto Chipande, published first in *Mozambique Revolution* and later in Mondlane's book, *Struggle for Mozambique*<sup>2</sup>. Even Yussuf Adam does not study the pub-

\* This article was presented at the African Studies Association annual meeting, Chicago, Illinois, 1st November, 1998, during the panel «French-speaking Research on Portuguese-speaking Africa» (chairperson, Kathleen Sheldon). It is assumed that the general history of late colonialism in Mozambique, as well as the founding myths of «Mueda» for Mozambican nationalism, are known. As a simple written version of a conference paper, I have not included here all the archive apparatus footnotes the final version will obviously contain.

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<sup>1</sup> *Arquivo. Boletim do Arquivo histórico de Moçambique* (Maputo, AHM), n° 14, special issue on Cabo Delgado, Oct. 1993, 202 p.: see articles by ADAM, Y. «Mueda 1917-1990: resistência, colonialismo, libertação e desenvolvimento», pp. 9-102; by ADAM, Y. & DYUTI, H. A. «O massacre de Mueda: falam testemunhas», pp. 117-128; by J.P. Borges COELHO (ed.), «Documento: o Estado colonial e o massacre de Mueda: processo de Quibirite Divane e Faustino Vanombe», pp. 129-155. Before these historical studies, a first and short historiographical approach had been attempted by SILVA, Teresa Cruz e Alexandrino JOSÉ in their article: «História e a problemática dos factos», in JOSÉ, Alexandrino & MENESES, Paula Maria G. *Moçambique – 16 anos de historiografia*, Maputo, [Painel Moçambicano], 1991 (published in August 1992), 317 p., pp. 17-27 (about Mueda – see pp. 19-22 –, these authors concluded: «Sobre o massacre de Mueda [...] não nos parece [...] que se tenha feito um esforço para tentar comparar os diversos testemunhos existentes, do lado dos Portugueses e do lado dos Moçambicanos, reinterpretando os acontecimentos em função dos interesses de ambos os lados », p. 22).

<sup>2</sup> «The massacre of Mueda, 16 June 1960-1970», *Mozambique Revolution* (Dar Es-Salaam, Frelimo/DIP), n° 43, April-June, 1970, pp. 12-14; also in French: «Massacre à Mueda», *Frelimo Information* (Alger, Frelimo), September, 1970, pp. 7-10; MONDLANE, E. *Struggle for Mozambique*, Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1969, 222 p. (1st edition); *Lutar por Moçambique*, Maputo, Nosso Chão, 1995, 200 p. (1st Mozambican edition; for Chipande's testimony, see p. 98).

lic demonstration or the riot of Mueda on 16<sup>th</sup> June 1960, but investigates the social history of the Maconde region, whereas Borges Coelho edits some very useful indeed official pieces of the trial, without however producing a political history of the case.

The testimony of Chipande, who became one of the most powerful military chiefs of Frelimo (Mozambique Liberation Front), remained the only source, and was repeated not only by Chipande himself in the weekly *Tempo* or in the daily *Notícias*<sup>3</sup>, but also by some academic researchers, including American ones...

It is always a risk to summarize, but the global explanation of Mueda, the official history of the case, goes as following: on 16<sup>th</sup> June 1960, a large crowd of Maconde people gathered in Mueda, the district capital of the Maconde area, to hear a Manu (Mozambique African National Union) delegation which had come to ask for independence. Manu was a Dar Es-Salaam-based ethno-nationalist association; in spite of its name – *Mozambique African...* – it was in fact a *Maconde African Union*. The District Commissioner in Mueda, Garcia Soares, had invited the Cabo Delgado Governor, Teixeira da Silva, to answer this independence claim. The Manu leaders were Faustino Vanomba and Kibirite Diwane. But Teixeira da Silva only spoke about social and economic progress, and arrested F. Vanomba and K. Diwane. The crowd began to throw stones at the Portuguese people present. The army, which was hidden nearby, came and fired shots at the crowd, causing about 600 deaths. After the massacre, the administration prohibited the cotton cooperative movement and Manu built itself on the planalto but later abandoned its ethno-nationalist leanings to join Frelimo.

This version has been constantly repeated, including in Mueda, where, once a year, a theater play is performed in remembrance of the massacre.

### A very functional story

As we can see, this way of presenting the history is a very functional one: indeed, to send a delegation to Mueda and not to Lourenço Marques (today's Maputo), capital city of the colony, or even Porto Amélia (today's Pemba), capital of Cabo Delgado province, to ask for

<sup>3</sup> «Entrevista com Alberto Chipande: os primeiros tiros», *Tempo* (Maputo), n° 312, 26th September 1976, pp. 18-23; «17° aniversário-dia da Resistência. A consciência da libertação desenvolvia-se em África. Alberto Chipande descrevendo o massacre de Mueda», *Notícias* (Maputo), 16th of June, 1977 (interview by Wilfred Burchet, of 1976).

independence, was a very ingenuous idea; and to ask for independence only for Maconde people was still part of the tribalist consciousness. Mueda thus appears to be a step, a proto- and ethno-nationalist step towards the modern nationalism of Frelimo. Frelimo appeared with a modern project unifying the regional claims and producing the nation. On the other hand, the Portuguese answer legitimizes the armed struggle. Chipande presents himself as a survivor, the link between the event and Frelimo.

For me, even before beginning to study the case, this way of presenting the story was amazing: how could Manu, strongly linked to Tanu (Nyerere's Tanganyika African National Union), go to Mueda and ask for independence? Why 600 dead when we know there was virtually no military force at that moment (1960) in Cabo Delgado? And why did Manu continue to exist after the foundation of Frelimo? So I began my research. I discovered that the massacre did not cause 600 deaths, but actually between 9 and 36 deaths. The public demonstration was not a public demonstration but a «*banja*» (official public meeting) requested by the Mueda administration. The Portuguese military force was not a battalion, but a two-jeep affair (eight persons). Faustino Vanomba and Kibirite Diwane were not members of Manu, but of a rival association, the Mozambique African Association of Tanga. And they did not come to ask for independence, but to negotiate with the local administration the return to Mozambique of the Maconde community that had emigrated to Tanganyika. On the contrary, they were collaborators and informants of the Portuguese Consulate in Dar Es-Salaam<sup>4</sup>. And it is highly likely that Joaquim Chipande was not even personally present at the time in Mueda-*sede* (chief town), because he was a member of *Linguilanilo*, the cooperative movement organized by Lázaro N'Kavandame which had nothing to do with the Vanomba and Diwane delegation from Tanganyika.

Nevertheless, one thing remains: even if the massacre caused «only» nine deaths, it was the most serious military incident since the end of the Barué revolt in 1921. And above all, its political significance remains unchanged: the Portuguese administration in the late fifties, before the Angolan revolt and before the liberation of Goa by India, was not at all ready to understand the «winds of History», and Mueda actually showed the need for armed struggle<sup>5</sup>.

<sup>4</sup> ... which does not mean they were Pide agents. Above all, at that moment (before the beginning of the armed struggle in Mozambique and in Angola), it was very different to collaborate with the Goan-rooted Portuguese consul in Dar Es-Salaam and to act as Pide agents.

<sup>5</sup> On the specific case of Mueda, only four persons in the Portuguese administration understood the

What did I do? I have to confess to a weakness in my research: I was not able to carry out field research in Mueda (I was there only very briefly). African sources have already been collected and used by African Studies Center researchers at Maputo's Eduardo Mondlane University, and I have had access to some of them<sup>6</sup>. But I think I was able to remain rigorously faithful to history because, besides analyzing in detail all Chipande's testimonies (1968, 1970, 1976, 1977), I managed to meet in Portugal with virtually all the Portuguese administration members of Mueda and Pemba still alive, as well as with the military commander, question them separately, then compare their testimonies – including the testimony of the 94-year-old former governor of Cabo Delgado. On the other hand, the Pide and SCCIM archives at Lisbon have been opened for three years at Torre do Tombo National Archives, and I immediately dived into them (resurfacing with some difficulty). I no longer have any doubts about the actual events. Some details will remain obscure, but I think I can now present a renewed historical analysis of the case.

### Colonized in foreign colonies

To understand anything about the Mueda riot of 16<sup>th</sup> June 1960, we first have to analyze the political life of the Mozambican Maconde émigré communities in Tanganyika, Zanzibar and Kenya (Mombassa).

As you know, the former territory of the Nyassa Company in the far north of Mozambique had harshly been exploited, but with a very low-profile «physical» presence by the Portuguese administration. A lot of Maconde people, not only Maconde – Macuas, Nianjas, Niassas... – emigrated to Tanganyika, Zanzibar and Kenya to work in particular on sisal plantations. In British East Africa life was difficult but, after the Second World War, there was no longer forced labor; an African could open his own store or shop, he could have a driving license. For the depth of the phenomenon: the «chefe de posto» and bush hunter Godinho, the Coordination and Centralization Intelligence Service (SCCIM) director, Afonso Henrique Ivens Ferraz Freitas; the anthropologist Jorge Dias and the «official secret agent» Jorge Jardim who came there the day after. But the misunderstanding, the psychological hang-up of the Portuguese administration remained complete, in particular on the level of provincial administration in Porto Amélia and colonial government in Lourenço Marques.

<sup>6</sup> It is important to mention that these oral sources – at least the transcribed interviews I have had access to, and the ones published by Borges COELHO (*Arquivo, op. cit.*) –, were collected after independence and were very clearly influenced by the new political context created by the very arrival of researchers coming from the far south, from the capital city, from the «nation». The interviewed persons, then, reproduced exactly *but spontaneously* the discourse they were supposed to deliver. But, exactly for that reason, it is also a very interesting oral archive that the historical critique has to deconstruct. See also some comments by ADAM, Y. & DYUTI, H.A. *op. cit.*

ones who had remained in Mozambique, close to the border, it was good to cross the Rovuma river to sell their products at better prices in Tanganyika border districts.

I will not give all the details here, but there were several émigré communities in British East Africa, with geographical and social differences: in the Tanga, Mogororo and Mombassa hinterlands, the Maconde communities were almost all workers on sisal plantations, while in Zanzibar and Dar Es-Salaam, apart from the sisal plantations, it seems there were more urban jobs and the beginnings of social differentiation, a very small elite. In the South of Tanganyika (Lindi, Mtwara, etc.), there were some Maconde merchants and planters. But particularly in Dar Es-Salaam, the deeper integration of Maconde people led to their being seen as Tanganyikans and not Mozambicans by the peasant Maconde communities in Tanga – they were often second- or third-generation Tanganyikans<sup>7</sup>, knew how to speak English and very often did not speak any Portuguese. It was an important social and psychological differentiation. Moreover, the small Maconde elite in Dar joined the Tanu party when in Tanga the peasant communities refused. In Zanzibar the two situations existed, since one part of the Macondes of Mozambique joined the Afro-Shirazi Party<sup>8</sup>.

To the first split between «more urban / more Tanganyikan» and «more peasant / more Mozambican» Macondes, a second split was added when some educated Mozambicans began to appear in Dar Es-Salaam. Before this, the Macondes in Tanga did not want the leadership of the Dar Maconde group, because «they wanted Mozambican leaders, not Tanganyikans»; but later felt that these new educated Mozambicans were «Portuguese» and continued to refuse their leadership. These splits were expressed afterwards by different international links.

In 1957, several «Maconde Clubs» or «Macua and Maconde Clubs» began to appear, along with some other ones in Dar, Tanga, Zanzibar, Pemba, Mogororo and Mombassa, etc. – it is almost certain that some «clubs» had existed before, but without any legal registration or stabilization<sup>9</sup>. Each one had its own life and leadership. These clubs were formed thanks to the 1954 colonial «Societies Ordinance»

<sup>7</sup> For example, Mathews Mmole, president of Dar Manu in 1960, was born at the Dutch Catholic mission of Dande, in Tanganyika. About Manu, see *infra*.

<sup>8</sup> Even after the foundation of Frelimo, the Afro-Shirazi Party maintained its «Mozambican section», against the will of Frelimo.

<sup>9</sup> There are some reasons to think of much earlier clubs, after 1st World War.

on «social societies». In the South appeared a Dutch Catholic-mission-based «Association of Catholic Macondes»<sup>10</sup>. The unification of these clubs remained very difficult. But there was another simultaneous reason for the appearance of more formalized Maconde groups, or at least the Dar and Tanga ones: previously, Tanu had obliged Mozambican Macondes to be members of it. When Tanu abandoned this procedure, which seemed not to have worked very well, a space opened up for Maconde autonomous social and political activity. Under the new British law, it could be more advantageous to instrumentalize the Mozambican Maconde groups than to integrate them<sup>11</sup>. In 1957 two separate groups appeared in Dar and Tanga. In Dar Es-Salaam, the Tanganyika Mozambique Maconde Union (TMMU) appeared – with Tiago Mula Mulombe as President, Joaquim Felix as Vice-President, Thomaz Nyayaula as Secretary, Faustino Vanomba as Treasurer – which on 21<sup>st</sup> October 1958 obtained its registration and had close ties with Tanu (almost every TMMU founding member in Dar used to have the membership card of Tanu, called *Cadi Chama Tanu*). In Tanga, the Tanganyika Mozambique Maconde Association (TMMA) was born under the leadership of Kiribite Diwane. But TMMA failed to obtain its registration and then acted as a branch of TMMU in Tanga. However, a little later (at the end of 1958), F. Vanomba and Tangazi Makalika (another member of the board) were expelled from TMMU in Dar Es-Salaam, and K. Diwane in Tanga choose them instead of TMMU: they succeeded in remaining legally registered through a Mozambique African Association (MAA) in Tanga at the beginning of 1960, within an interesting context. It seems that in fact they began, in 1959, to integrate their group into a small former Niassa (probably Nianja) group, also named Mozambique African Association, which was not a political association and had already been registered, with only twelve members, on 26<sup>th</sup> July 1957<sup>12</sup>. (It is interesting to note that, in its search for legal registration, the strong

<sup>10</sup> The Dutch Catholic missions in Southern Tanganyika and Northern Mozambique had always thought about using the Mozambican Maconde community as the *fer de lance* of a resistance against Muslim progress. Therefore, they supported the Maconde association movement, behavior which so much frightened official Portuguese anthropologist Jorge Dias when he visited Tanganyika!

<sup>11</sup> This new behavior towards Mozambicans didn't prevent Tanu membership cards from being sold to Mozambicans, including in northern Mozambique. The *Cadi Chama Tanu* (Tanu membership card) was known among Maconde people in Mozambique as *Cadi Linguilanilo*. «Linguilanilo» (see *supra*) was the Maconde name for the cooperativist movement of Lárazo N'Kavandame (in Portuguese *Sociedade africana algodoeira voluntária de Moçambique*, SAAVM) who had had, before 1960, a huge success in developing free labor cotton cultivation, against forced cultivation by the officially recognized colonial companies.

<sup>12</sup> Portuguese secret service documents distinguish the MAA-1 (the former Niassa one) from the MAA-2 (the new Maconde one).

Tanga Maconde branch preferred to unify with a small Niassa-Nianja group of Tanga, instead of working with the Maconde leadership in Dar.) The new Tanga MAA quickly became the main association with two thousand members, while the Dar TMMU had only four hundred (the main reason for this is the Maconde community in Tanga and its hinterland was a very big one). As a further step, in an obvious rivalry with TMMU, F. Vanomba and T. Magalika opened a branch of MAA in Dar Es-Salaam.

In Zanzibar there was the «Zanzibar Club» or ZMMU, the Zanzibar Macondes and Macuas Union. There seems to have been in Zanzibar some inter-ethnic co-existence which was not to exist in continental Tanganyika until the creation of Udenamo and Frelimo never existed before Udenamo and Frelimo in continental Tanganyika. ZMMU was independent but had relations with Dar TMMU. ZMMU had a branch in Pemba, the northern island of the sultanate, which seems to have had relations with Tanga MAA.

We can thus see that the histories of these groups are different: while TMMU is the product of Tanu activity among the Mozambican Macondes, MAA and ZMMU are traditional associations of migrant workers, «mutualist clubism». This is why their goals were quite different. Even though, at that time, nobody was speaking about armed struggle, TMMU was moving away from Maconde mutualist clubism towards an implicit ethno-nationalism which permitted the official expression of a moderate but politicized nationalism – and obviously did not want any link with Portuguese consulates. On the contrary, the Tanga MAA and, to a lesser extent, the Zanzibar MMU, were also slowly escaping from mutualism, but, as migrant worker organizations, wanted to organize links of their members with the Maconde families and land in Mozambique and, therefore, wanted to have relations with and to be recognized by the Portuguese consulates<sup>13</sup>.

Thus, when the Tanga MAA, or the Dar branch of it, went to contact the Portuguese consul in 1959 and early 1960, they were welcomed. The consul accepted the demand of MAA to open a Portuguese school for Maconde people in Tanga (knowledge of the Portuguese language could be useful when migrant workers came back) and subsi-

<sup>13</sup> It is necessary to specify that the Portuguese diplomatic presence in British East Africa was weak: only the consul in Nairobi was a professional one, while the consuls (or vice-consuls) in Mombassa, Dar and Zanzibar were honorary consuls and were not metropolitan Portuguese but Goese. Portugal had a certain knowledge of its Goan communities in British East Africa, since Goese were Portuguese citizens, but virtually ignored the Maconde communities since they were indigenous and, contrary to the situation in South Africa or South Rhodesia, there was not any «*Curadoria dos indigenas*» (Indigenous Labor Bureau) in Tanganyika to control the migrants.

dized MAA. ZMMU still accepted to be subsidized by the Portuguese consul in Zanzibar as late as October 1960, that is to say after the Mueda riot, thereby facing the anger of the Pemba branch and the now-repressed Tanga MAA. But there was more: before Mueda, MAA had considered the politicized TMMU of Dar as a danger to the building of its relationship with Portugal. Faustino Vanomba and Kibirite Diwane agreed to inform the Portuguese consulate about all the activities of TMMU: they were even the main informants of the Portuguese consul<sup>14</sup>. But we have to understand that there was not only a traditional rivalry between local leaderships, but a fundamental difference in goals. Indeed, in the late fifties, the main concern of Maconde communities in Tanganyika became the desire to return to Mozambique. For this purpose, MAA had to negotiate the organization of this Maconde back-migration with Portugal, had to keep a good relationship with the colonial authorities.

Why this desire to come back? For several convergent reasons.

### **Coming back with, or against Portugal?**

First, with the autonomy of Tanganyika, the social and trade-unionist movements obtained salary increases. On sisal plantations, this resulted in the companies requiring more and more manpower profitability, more and more speed in doing piecework. Obviously, they needed a lower number of workers, and the first ones to be dismissed were the foreigners, in other words the Mozambicans, and in particular the Macondes. Moreover, the Tanganyika Federation of Labor (TFL) – the Tanu-linked trade-union – asked for the expulsion from Tanganyika of all «South African and Portuguese citizens»... (TFL was talking about 200,000 people, which obviously shows that the «Portuguese citizens» were the Mozambican indigenous – a pretty leftist way of expressing xenophobic thinking!). In 1960, when Tanu and the autonomous territorial government organized a general census of the population, it created a big problem among Mozambicans, because one of the questions was: «To which paramount chief do you belong?». And when they answered that their chiefs were in Mozambique, they were told they had to go back just after their harvest; they could fear, in a traditional way of thinking, becoming captives submitted to the newly-recognized local chiefs. Furthermore, the independence of Tanganyika which appeared to be coming provoked

<sup>14</sup> See note 4, *supra*.



sympathy but anxiety too: this independence was seen as a Swahili power independence – the power of the same Swahili who, last century, had put many Macondes into slavery<sup>15</sup>.

But as the social and political problems were growing – or were perceived as growing – in Tanganyika, the situation was improving in Mozambique. At the end of the fifties, forced labor was no longer the selvatic kind as in the forties: there was a small urbanization, more schools, small salary increases, etc. The difference between British and Portuguese colonialism was decreasing in favor of Portugal. Thus, if it was necessary to quit Tanganyika, it was now *possible* to think of coming back to Mozambique.

In 1959, Faustino Vanomba came to Mozambique and then back to Tanganyika with the idea of an MAA recognized on both sides of the Rovuma river border. The society would act as the body to help and manage the return of the community. F. Vanomba would have his concrete house in front of the district commissioner's. On the local level of Mueda, the Portuguese administration was divided, accepting individual returns but hesitating when faced with an MAA-sponsored mass return. But on the Porto Amélia and Lourenço Marques levels, this issue was not even questioned. Nevertheless, MAA continued to dream of having its headquarters, no longer in Tanga, but in Mueda, registered in the Portuguese province as SAM (*Sociedade dos Africanos de Moçambique*), in order to manage the migrants coming back and their re-integration<sup>16</sup>. When, on 13<sup>th</sup> March 1960, the leadership of TMMU (Tanganyika Mozambique Maconde Union) wanted to change its name to Manu (Mozambique African National Union), MAA-SAM, with the help of the Portuguese consulate, organized a movement against the transformation, filling the meeting room with seventy «faithful Macondes», and the transformation was actually refused by the majority of the present members<sup>17</sup>. Nevertheless, Félix Joaquim and Thomaz Nyayaula submitted the new statutes for registration by the (still) colonial authorities, which refused them. But *Mwafrica*, the

<sup>15</sup> One might think that this anxiety was more felt by peasant Macondes in Tanga than by more politicized TMMU members in Dar.

<sup>16</sup> It was not at all impossible: Portugal could not recognize SAM as a «Portuguese branch» of a Tanganyikan based association, but could legalize the SAM as an independent society. It may be astonishing to remember that there were a lot of African associations legally recognized under colonial salazarism. It was even the best way of watching over the black elite. The problem of recognizing the SAM was not a legal one, but a political one.

<sup>17</sup> To understand the day-to-day disorderly life of the Maconde clubs at the end of the fifties and the very beginning of the sixties, it is interesting to note that, even if Faustino Vanaomba had already and officially split from TMMU, he participated in the meeting to transform TMMU into Manu, in the seventy pro-Portuguese group!

Tanu daily paper, announced the modification and Mathews Mmole, a 25-year-old Maconde from Tanganyika (see note 7) became president of the Manu, ousting Félix Joaquim from the former TMMU<sup>18</sup>... But the hostility of MAA-SAM to the transformation was not the problem of the disappearance of the word «maconde» from the new acronym «Manu», since it was not present either in the MAA-SAM acronym, but the fact that now Manu would be officially, politically and socially a body like Tanu and Kanu (Kenya African National Union), which is to say a nationalist party. In Zanzibar, on 25<sup>th</sup> June 1960, ZMMU adopted the same name change, becoming Z-Manu, but one part refused and later joined Udenamo (see *infra*).

To summarize, at that moment there was on the one hand a small politicized group around TMMU-Manu at Dar, and on the other a big mutual association movement around the large peasant community in the hinterland of Tanga. The latter wanted to *secure its relationship with the Portuguese administration to organize the way back*.

But there was a big problem: to come back, but how? In Tanganyika, there was no forced labor, as continued to be the case in Mozambique; it was possible for an African to be owner of a shop while in Mozambique the indigenous could not; even when it was possible (with protection), they could not hold a driving license (necessary for them to have a delivery van), since to have it, it was necessary to have the «4<sup>e</sup> classe» of primary school – and so on. Maconde people in Tanganyika had experienced the more modern and «free» British colonial capitalism and wanted to find the same situation in Mozambique. So the Tanga MAA-SAM sent several delegations to Mueda with visas from the Dar consulate, in order to negotiate these difficult conditions. The Mueda administration's answer was always that this had to be decided in Lourenço Marques: — «Go back to Tanganyika and wait there».

With a visa from the Goan Portuguese honorary consul in Dar, delivered on 4<sup>th</sup> January 1960, Faustino Vanomba once again entered Mozambique on 28<sup>th</sup> January. He was in Naengo (near Mueda) to have a talk with the *régulo* (local African chief) on 6<sup>th</sup> February, and afterwards went to Mueda to meet with the District Commissioner Garcia Soares. Intendant of Cabo Delgado, Cotta Mesquita came from Porto Amélia (Pemba) to Mueda on 19<sup>th</sup> February with the specific purpose of meeting him. He was not arrested, but, as he had organized sever-

<sup>18</sup> Félix Joaquim was born a Catholic, but later converted to Protestant UMCA. It seems this rivalry between the Dutch Catholics of Southern Tanganyika and Protestants played a certain role in the internal disputes.

al, often nightly, banjas, Cotta Mesquita ordered him to leave the country on 23<sup>rd</sup> February, subsidizing his traveling costs. He went back free to Dar (we have already seen that, in spite of the lack of answers from the Portuguese administration in Mueda, at the time F. Vanomba remained pro-Portuguese, helping the consulate in Dar against the transformation of TMMU into Manu). The Mueda administration did not know that he was accompanied, on a separate route, by seven Macondes (including a woman, Madesta Yussufo). This group of seven was to return to Mozambique some weeks later, once again to hear the «answer». But this delegation, without any visa, was arrested, causing the beginning of the politicization of the MAA-SAM. After that, when Tiago Mula Mulombe and his six followers<sup>19</sup> from the rival Manu came to Mueda on 17<sup>th</sup> March, anxious to know about the activity and establishment of MAA-SAM on the Mueda plateau, they had no visa from the Portuguese consulate and were arrested on 27<sup>th</sup> April. Faustino Vanomba and Kibirite Diwane decided to come back in person, to ask why «their» seven had been arrested and to listen to the answer about the return of the Maconde émigré community. But then the situation was already dangerous for Portugal, because each delegation (several from MAA-SAM and one from Manu) had organized banjas among the population, and the arrests had provoked some agitation and the *Uhuru* claim, that is, *freedom for the land* (which was not synonymous with independence).

I will not tell you here all the details of the 16<sup>th</sup> June riot – I will give them minute by minute in the final version of the study –, but one thing remains certain: the great irresponsibility of the Cabo Delgado governor, admiral Teixeira da Silva. He asked the Mueda administration to convene a great assembly, not only of Mueda, but also Nairoto, Nangololo, Mocimboa do Rovuma, for him to explain to the Maconde people the historical aims of Portugal... He prohibited the military squad of Pemba from coming with him, and it was by disobedience that the intendant of Cabo Delgado, Cotta Mesquita, ordered two jeeps to follow him, five kilometers behind. Teixeira da Silva had calmed down a popular riot in Madeira in the forties, and he was thinking he would be able to do the same in 1960 at Mueda, with his white, heavily-medalled navy uniform, speaking (in Portuguese) to the crowd...

He did speak a lot, about the prices, the roads and so on, but nothing about *the right to return free* and *the freedom to return* of the Maconde people. Afterwards, in spite of the hesitation of district com-

<sup>19</sup> Maconde delegations are very often composed of a group of seven persons.

missioner Garcia Soares and *chefe de posto* Godinho, he ordered the public arrest of Vanomba and Diwane in front of 5,000 people... Then the eight «*cipaios*» (rural indigenous guards, with guns dating from the First World War) had to shoot into the air to prevent the crowd from freeing the prisoners – and the noise alerted the two military jeeps which had slowly moved forward and were now only about one kilometer behind, and had come with two submachine guns (one of them didn't work!). Some people were killed or wounded by the bullets, and others were crushed during the panic escape of the crowd. One thousand bicycles were abandoned...

Faustino Vanomba and Quibirite Diwane were taken to Mocimboa da Praia and, later, to Porto Amélia (Pemba), the capital city of the Cabo Delgado province. Later, at Lourenço Marques (Maputo), they were condemned to several years of prison. After this period, they were not freed but placed under house arrest, F. Vanomba in Mambone, a remote village of Sofala province in the center of the country, and Q. Diwane in Inhambane, a small town in the South.

For Maconde people this event was the «answer» and meant that it was necessary to wage war against Portugal. Portugal, which could still have *dissociated* the politicized minority group from the majority group willing to organize only the return, in fact *reunified* the two branches and failed completely in producing a huge propaganda operation: the mass return of «Portuguese Macondes», from Tanganyika to independence, to Mozambique, to Portuguese *Mãe Pátria* (motherland). Portugal's obsolescent dictatorship transformed an ethnic movement which could still have been treated as a social problem into a political will.

The Maconde people was now ready to follow the first person who could wage war.

### **The will to go to war**

But it was not so simple... With the disappearance of F. Vanomba and K. Diwane, Tanga MAA-SAM had lost its two main leaders. The only remaining main leader, Tangazi Makalika in Dar, was very discouraged and first thought of closing the association. After, he tried to contact the Portuguese consulate again, probably in order to resume relations, but obviously he was no longer welcome. Then he briefly joined Manu, but soon preferred to join Udenamo (*União democrática nacional de Moçambique*, Democratic National

Mozambique Union), organized in Tanganyika by Adelino Gwambe and Uria Simango after the Rhodesian period<sup>20</sup>.

In Bulawayo (Rhodesia), Uria Simango had organized the Portuguese East Africa Society (PEAS), a non-political society which was acting as the legal form of his small clandestine PCN (*Partido da Convenção nacional*, National Convention Party). A. Gwambe had probably already created a very small group in Salisbury, also with links to PEAS, but it is not clear at all if this group was already named Udenamo (I think it was not). But when A. Gwambe fled from Salisbury to Dar Es-Salaam and founded Udenamo, Simango agreed to forget the PCN and to consider PEAS as the legal form of Udenamo, whether in Bulawayo or in Salisbury. However, Gwambe did not act immediately: on arriving in Dar, he had become a member of Manu, and had not organized his Udenamo. He and Mathews Mmole were sent to represent Manu at the Casablanca meeting of CONCP (*Conferência das organizações nacionalistas das colônias portuguesas*, Conference of Portuguese Colonies Nationalist Organizations). But he came back... as the president of the newly founded Udenamo... In fact Mmole and Manu already had links with PAFMECSA (Pan-Africanist Freedom Movement of East, Central and Southern Africa), an English-speaking movement which had no relations with the Portuguese-speaking CONCP. With an invitation funded by the Goan opposition to participate in the CONCP meeting Portuguese Catholic-educated A. Gwambe profited from his new international links to found Udenamo, as the Mozambican branch of CONCP. Actually, when Gwambe created Udenamo, he did nothing but portugal-ize the acronym «Manu», adding only the adjective «democratic» which expressed here the split within the emigration between the anglophone-ized second generation (such as Mmole) and the new political migrants, more often Portuguese-speakers and contacted by the left-wing Portuguese opposition, such as Gwambe. Later, U. Simango left Rhodesia and joined Gwambe in Dar.

Then, even though they were not Maconde, Gwambe and Simango could appear to the MAA-SAM leaders as «true Mozambicans» and not «Tanganyikans» or Tanu-linked persons. At this very moment, the ethnic aspect, although important, was not at all the only one, and the split was also social and educational.

<sup>20</sup> However it seems that these zigzags of Makalika in Dar had some effects in Tanga: at the beginning the main part remained faithful toward Makalika and followed him to Udenamo, but one part of Tanga MAA members refused. Later, with the help and pressure of Tanu, they succeeded in reconstituting a Manu branch in Tanga in March 1962.

Refusing the anglophone and Swahili-zed Dar Es-Salaam leadership, it was easier for the Maconde Tangazi Makalika leader of Tanga MAA-SAM to join Udenamo than Maconde Manu.

On one side, even if Gwambe was from Inhambane province and Simango from Sofala, Udenamo was not – in complete contradiction with what has always been written – a southern or central Mozambique group. Thanks to MAA-SAM, its headquarters in Tanga but also in Dar were full of young Macondes: in December 1961, Udenamo had 261 members in Dar, 406 in Morogoro and 2,904 in Tanga, which shows that it had members proportional to the size of the Mozambican Maconde communities.

On the other side, Manu, which officially participated in the foundation of Frelimo, had not succeeded in federating all the Maconde Clubs. As well as the Tanga refusal and difficult late reorganization (see note 20) in Zanzibar, in fact there was a split within the club between those who accepted Manu and those who preferred A. Gwambe's Udenamo. This split nevertheless did not produce two separate organizations but rather two factions within the club: the fact is, eighteen months later, Z-Manu did not participate in the foundation of Frelimo and strongly protested against the decision of M. Mmole to join it<sup>21</sup>. In Mombassa too, where TMMU had never had a branch, the Manu was refused at the beginning, and MAA continued to have a local existence there, not joining Udenamo; later, it created a Manu, but a «Kenyan only» Manu supervised by a Kanu Maconde-rooted MP (even given that, it seems that some MAA remained in Mombassa, led by Daudi Atalupi). Furthermore, if Manu officially participated in the founding meeting of Frelimo, what did this behavior represent within the very Dar Manu nucleus? Did it represent any internal discussion or political maturing process? In fact, M. Mmole accepted the creation of Frelimo «without consulting anybody» – as he wrote in a letter justifying himself to Z-Manu – and even without meeting or knowing «Senhor. Eduardo» (*sic*, that is to say... Eduardo Mondlane). His main aim, apart from obeying Tanu orders, was to adjust with Udenamo and, above all, with Gwambe who had betrayed him at Casablanca. Actually, Gwambe had suddenly left Tanganyika a few days before 25<sup>th</sup> June – to avoid the last working session with Mondlane, before the foundation, when Mondlane had accepted to join Udenamo to make the process easier<sup>22</sup> –, . But he did

<sup>21</sup> But, in spite of the refusal of 25<sup>th</sup> of June, a delegation from the Zanzibar club was present at the first congress in September 1962.

<sup>22</sup> Gwambe had argued that, if the meeting was to be a unifying one, that meant that every partici-

want to come back and to talk to the meeting, addressing it *against* the creation of a new organization. However, the Tanganyikan government prevented him from coming back, and Udenamo was represented only by Uria Simango (and T. Makalika), and by Marcelino dos Santos (who had not been elected for that) – that is to say the pro-Mondlane wing within Udenamo. Ingenuously, Mmole thought that his personal decision could give him the leadership of Frelimo a short time later. The number of Manu members present at the foundation meeting was not big and Mmole managed only to be the treasurer, after Mondlane (who received the most votes and became president) and Uria Simango (who came second and became secretary). Socially speaking, despite Gwambe's defection, the foundation meeting was above all an Udenamo one, with a number of individuals without any former membership.

For all these reasons, when Frelimo was formed on 25<sup>th</sup> June 1962, to start with, a large part of its Maconde base did not come from Manu but from Udenamo, which had integrated a large part of the former Maconde clubs.

Frelimo had an interest in building up the story of a «southern and central Mozambique Udenamo» to show that unification with northern Maconde Manu and Zambezian Unami (*União nacional de Moçambique independente*, Independent Mozambique National Union) had produced a pluri-ethnic and pluri-regional new movement<sup>23</sup>. In fact, Udenamo, with Adelino Gwambe and his followers from Inhambane, Uria Simango and his followers from Manica e Sofala, and the Tangazi Makalika Maconde group was already a pluri-ethnic organization with a modernist program. This is actually why Marcelino dos Santos, secretary of CONCP in Morocco, had become a member of Udenamo, and why Eduardo Mondlane himself had decided to be a member of it, and had been accepted a few days before the Frelimo foundation meeting. But, besides his links with CONCP, Gwambe had close relations with Ghana and had made very vehement declarations about «his politics of violence and revolution», all of which was unacceptant had to be previously a member of one of the former clubs. Mondlane therefore had no choice but to join one of them. It is *socially* not surprising that he chose Udenamo rather than Manu or Unami.

<sup>23</sup> To understand how the «unifying meeting» of 25th June was understood by the former groups, it is interesting to note that Unami, present in low numbers on the very day (its president, Baltasar da Costa Chagonga, was *not* there even though his name was presented to the vote), was simultaneously asking for its legal registration in Tanganyika, which was refused on 27th June. Chagonga came back immediately to Blantyre. But Unami, neither splitting from nor integrating itself into Frelimo, hoped to be considered, and was in a certain way considered by E. Mondlane himself, as the Malawi branch of Frelimo, up to 1965.

ceptable to Tanu. Simango used this to expel him from the Frelimo foundation process and to support Mondlane... But this personal rivalry does not change the fact that the Maconde base of Frelimo came not only from Manu, but also from Udenamo – and probably for the main part.

Probably because of the weakness of the MAA-SAM leadership after the arrests in Mueda, the integration of a large number of Maconde members into Udenamo did not allow it to develop inside Mozambique, on the Maconde plateau. Before the Frelimo foundation in June 1962, Udenamo remained very probably the main group and was further reinforced by the adhesion of some Macondes educated at the Portuguese Catholic mission of Marire, at the beginning of 1962. But Manu had the political and skilled leadership support of Tanu. So Manu developed in Dar, but also in Tanga and Zanzibar (now with a Z-Manu from former ZMMU). It seems that later, in 1962 but before the Frelimo foundation, more and more Macondes began to move from Udenamo to Manu. Manu succeeded in installing more in the Maconde area in Mozambique and officially participated in the birth of Frelimo on 25<sup>th</sup> June 1962. We have already seen that Udenamo also participated in the foundation meeting, but had already split into Simango (participating) and Gwambe (non-participating) wings, with Makalika at first following Simango. Other leaders of former Udenamo (including Makalika) soon split from Frelimo when A. Gwambe reconstituted Udenamo, but its former Maconde base never returned to him. On the contrary, even though some weeks after the Frelimo foundation meeting Manu split from Frelimo, it was able to continue to develop, taking advantage of the deep divisions within Tanu (concerning the behavior towards Frelimo and Manu). After Mmole's expulsion from Frelimo in August 1962, Frelimo no longer had an important Maconde leader, a situation which was very dangerous, making possible serious ethnic tensions within the front. This is why in December 1962 contacts were established with the Maconde cooperativist leader, Lázaro N'Kavandame, and Cabo Delgado provincial chairmanship was offered to him, in spite of the distrust towards him of the Dar Frelimo leadership. Lázaro left Mozambique for southern Tanganyika at the beginning of 1963.

On side of the remaining Manu, in 1963 and 1964 harder repressive measures by the Tanzanian government, which had now chosen Frelimo, moved the leadership to Mombassa (Kenya) where MAA-SAM had continued and had finally, at least partly, joined the



remaining Manu. Lucas Fernandes, secretary of the MAA in Mombassa at least up to July 1963, had also been a member of Frelimo but had left it when Mmole had been expelled and then joined Manu. He became military chief of the newly reinforced Manu in Mombassa. On 18<sup>th</sup> June 1964, Manu decided to begin the armed struggle immediately<sup>24</sup>. In spite of Tanzanian hostility, Lucas Fernandes was able to introduce himself into Mozambique through Lindi and organize a 150-member Manu Youth League group to begin the war. Portuguese secret services were not able to identify his presence, but observed at the time that the Macondes were hesitating between Manu and Frelimo. They noted that «Manu is more important». Nevertheless, Lucas Fernandes made the huge mistake of killing the Dutch missionary Daniel Boorman on 24<sup>th</sup> August 1964 because his Catholic mission was helping Frelimo. Catholic Missions then denounced Manu in the Maconde area and helped the Portuguese authorities in their repression<sup>25</sup>. This fact completely destroyed Manu implantation on the plateau and enabled Frelimo to be the first to genuinely wage war<sup>26</sup>.

Thus was established a kind of «functional misunderstanding» between the Frelimo leadership and the Maconde base. The Maconde did not want independence for Mozambique; they did want freedom for their land, but were ready to follow whoever was able to wage war. So because of the ethnically-based positive warrior response from the Maconde people, the Frelimo leadership believed that the Maconde people were supporting its «Mozambican» orientation. This misunderstanding remained the basis for many internal Frelimo crises<sup>27</sup>, but

<sup>24</sup> ...after a Soviet promise of arms supplies. Up to 1966, the USSR had hesitated between the various Mozambican groups. The Manu decision may be understood as a way to appear believable and secure the arms supplies. There is no doubt that this Manu decision was a very important factor in the Frelimo decision, then, to accelerate its own armed struggle.

<sup>25</sup> On its side, the Portuguese secret police knew very well that these Dutch Catholic missions supported Frelimo... But at that time, Pide thought that Manu was the main danger.

<sup>26</sup> ... even though the date of 25th September 1964 («the first shot») is an invention. The first military incident was in July, in the Tacuane region (Zambezia), provoked by the small group of «Comandante Zodiaque», the Elipamo (*Exército de libertação do povo africano de Moçambique*), which is to say the armed branch of Gwambe's Udenamo (it is possible that «Zodiaque» was no more than Gwambe himself). This means that the «first first» shot was from Udenamo, and the «second first» shot was from Manu. Even on Frelimo's side, the first shot was in Niassa, during the night of 24th to 25th September, when the «officially registered first shot» by Chipande group was during the night of 25th to 26th September, already on the 26th...

<sup>27</sup> In particular, the dissidence of Lázaro N'Kavandame. N'Kavandame, a Catholic Maconde merchant, had come back early from Tanganyika during the fifties. His aim was to succeed in becoming in Mozambique what he had succeeded in being in Tanganyika, and to help other Macondes to do the same. It is completely false to present him as a «traditional leader»: on the contrary, he is the prototype of the «big man», the modern African merchant and planter. But the Portuguese administration did not permit him to become that. In 1960, he was not in Mueda and remained very criti-

continued to run until the end. Obviously Frelimo leadership had always sensed the danger. In the building of a myth, Faustino Vanomba and Quibirite Diwane could have been considered heroes by official Frelimo history<sup>28</sup>. Actually, Mueda entered the myth but was dehumanized, without the human beings who made it, with their complexity and their contradictions. Upon independence, F. Vanomba and Q. Diwane were not really freed and were not authorized by Frelimo to return to Mueda, both of them staying in Inhambane. Diwane died there on 30<sup>th</sup> January 1977<sup>29</sup>.

Up to 1977, when Frelimo, now in power, conducted the campaign to transform itself from a front into a «Marxist-Leninist» party, the Macondes refused en masse to buy the party membership cards, answering: — «Why buy these cards, when we, Macondes, are the Party?».

As you can see, the History is more complicated than the story.

cal of what Vanomba and Diwane had done. He fled back to Tanganyika in 1963 and was appointed Frelimo provincial chairman for Cabo Delgado. For him, Frelimo was the way to achieve what he had attempted by other means; his aim had not changed: allowing Maconde people and himself to modernize as in Tanganyika with «free» British capitalism. To do so, it was necessary to free the Maconde land quickly, a strategic choice Frelimo refused in order to prolong the war in Mozambique. N'Kavandame came back once again to Mozambique after Frelimo president Mondlane's death (9th February 1970), after being led, probably by Maconde elders in contact with Pide agents in Tanganyika, to believe that the Portuguese administration would now authorize a kind of economic autonomy for the Maconde area, with him as a regional chairman. Portugal obviously took advantage, organizing a huge psychological propaganda about the «end of the war» after the surrender of «Mzee N'Kavandame» – propaganda which failed completely. When, only a few months later, in July 1970, N'Kavandame understood that Portugal was not at all ready to accept any kind of autonomy for the Maconde people, he planned to come back again to Frelimo with his chairmen ! But Pide secret police intercepted the plan and N'Kavandame never succeeded in recovering any political space. The official history of Frelimo presents the crisis as a fight between the «bourgeois political wing» and the «revolutionary political wing». In fact, it was a *social gap* between two very different petty-bourgeois milieus: the rural modern merchant elite, and the urban bureaucratic petty-bourgeois elite of military Frelimo leadership. This social gap combined itself with, and was made worse by, the fact that this merchant milieu was ethnically Maconde, from the far north of Mozambique under the influence of British colonial free capitalism, when the bureaucratic one was ethnically changane and *assimilado* (assimilated, Blacks having Portuguese citizenship) or mulattoes, from the capital city and other towns of southern Mozambique where the small African elite was not at all merchant, but had small bureaucratic and service jobs.

<sup>28</sup> This is exactly what MPLA did in Angola with the myth of 4th February 1961. Even though, at that time, the insurgents were linked with UPA-FNLA, they themselves had been repeating for years that they were militants of MPLA..., which they became *afterwards*.

<sup>29</sup> A piece of information, given without any emphasis, in *Tempo*: «Mauvilo a ku Mweda», *Tempo*, n° 350, June of 1977, p. 45. I don't know if F. Vanomba is still alive and if he was, later, authorized to come back to Mueda.