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CONTEMPLATIO AND SPECULATIO: ARE THEY SYNONYMS OR NOT?

As an introduction to this text, I would like to present a short comment made by an anonymous author to William's of Ware thesis claiming that theology is a contemplative science. The term *contemplativus* is understood by William as the third element enlarging the Aristotelian distinction of sciences into practical and speculative, the element different from *speculativus* and *practicus*¹:

Contra opinionem Ware arguitur, quod idem est speculari et contemplari, (...) contemplari idem est quod conspiciere vel rimari. Sed constat, quod conspiciere et speculari idem sunt, quare etc. Unde Augustinus in illa auctoritate *De civitate*, VIII, cap. 4: "omne studium²" etc. dicit, quod contemplativa pertinet ad conspiciendas naturae causas et sincerissimam veritatem. Sed conspiciere naturae causas est speculari, quare idem est contemplari et speculari. Ista solvuntur per differentiam positam supra inter proprie speculari et contemplari³.

¹ For more detailed analysis of William's position, see below, pp. 441-443.

² Augustinus, *De civitate Dei. Libri I-X*, B. DOMBART, A. KALB (eds.), Turnholt 1955, Corpus Christianorum, t. 47, VIII, 4, p. 219, v. 17 - 220, v. 22: «Cum studium sapientiae in actione et contemplatione versetur, unde una pars eius activa, altera contemplativa dici potest (quorum activa ad agenda vitam, id est mores instruendos pertinet, contemplativa autem ad conspiciendas naturae causas et sincerissimam veritatem)».

³ This fragment was quoted by L. Amorós in his article (L. AMORÓS, «La teología como ciencia práctica en la escuela franciscana en los tiempos que preceden a Escoto. Edición de textos», *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen-Age* 9 (1934) 261-303, cfr. 303) at the end of the edition of Question 4 from the Prologue of William's *Commentary to the Sentences*. My edition was based on two Florentine manuscripts: Firenze, Biblioteca Laurenziana: plut. 33 dex. 1 (=L); Biblioteca Nazionale: conv. sopr. A 4 42 (=N). Amorós stated that this *impugnatio* was to be found in the Laurenziana manuscript but he did not notice that it is also present the Nazionale manuscript; these two versions differ in some details.

The argument given by the commentator of William's work states clearly the synonymy of *contemplatio* and *speculatio* because of the similarity of their basic dictionary meanings. He adds that such understanding of these terms was shared also by St. Augustinus, whose terminology was very influential on Latin used by medieval scholars.

The synonymy of *contemplatio* and *speculatio* could be supported by another argument, very significant for thinkers from the 13th and 14th centuries. Namely, both terms were used in the translations of Aristotle's texts as counterparts of one and the same Greek word: θεωρία and its derivatives. Θεωρία and θεωρητικός were translated as *speculatio* and *speculativus* in *Metaphysics*: e.g., XII, 7 (1072b 24): ἡ θεωρία τὸ ἥδιστον καὶ ἄριστον in Latin translations is: «speculatio optimum et maxime delectabile est» (Apud Iunctas, t. VIII, f. 321I-K) «speculatio delectabilissimum et optimum» (Moerbeke); II, 1 (993b 21): θεωρητικῆς μὲν γὰρ τέλος ἀλήθεια πρακτικῆς δ' ἔργον - «Finis enim scientiae speculativae est veritas et finis scientiae operativae est actio» (Apud Iunctas, t. VIII, f. 29H), «Nam theoricae finis est veritas, et practicae opus» (Moerbeke)⁴. But the same terms were translated as *contemplatio* and *contemplativus* in *Nicomachean Ethics*: e.g., X, 8 (1178b 32): ἡ εὐδαιμονία θεωρία τις - «Felicitas contemplatio quaedam est» (Apud Iunctas, t. III, f. 154M), «Erit utique felicitas speculatio quaedam»⁵; I, 2 (1095b 17-19): τρεῖς γὰρ εἰσι μάλιστα οἱ προὔχοντες, ὃ τε νῦν εἰρημενος καὶ ὁ πολιτικός καὶ τρίτος ὁ θεωρητικός - «Tres enim sunt, quae maxime excellunt vitae, haec quam modo dixi, tum civilis ac contemplativa tertia» (Apud Iunctas, t. III, f. 43G), «Tres enim sunt maxime excellentes, et quae nunc dicta est et quae civilis est, et tertia, quae contemplativa est»⁶. Such synonymous usage of both terms was quite popular among 13th century authors, even if they belonged to different intellectual traditions.

⁴ Moerbeke's translation is quoted according to the trilingual Polish edition: Arystoteles, Τὰ μετὰ τὰ φυσικά, *Metaphysica, Metafizyka*, Lublin 1996, t. 1-2. Cfr. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, I, 2 (982b 9), VI, 1 (1025b 25), *On the Soul*, III, 10 (433a 14-15). So called *Transalio media* of *Metaphysics* uses *theoria*, *theoricus* in these fragments, cf. Aristoteles Latinus, *Metaphysica*, G. VUILLEMIN-DIEM (ed.), t. XXV, 2, Leiden 1976, p. 37, 1 and 214, 17.

⁵ Aristoteles Latinus, *Ethica Nicomachea* trans. Roberti Grosseteste, R.A. GAUTHIER (ed.), t. XXV, 3, Leiden-Bruxelles 1972, p. 363, v. 13.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 145, v. 8-9. Cfr. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, X, 7 (1177a 16-18).

Let us consider, e.g. the following passage from St. Bonaventure's *Commentary to the Sentences*:

Nam si consideremus intellectum in se, sic est proprie speculativus et perficitur ab habitu, qui est contemplationis gratia, qui dicitur scientia speculativa. Si autem consideremus ipsum ut natum extendi ad opus, sic perficitur ab habitu, qui est, ut boni fiamus; et hic est scientia practica sive moralis. Si autem medio modo consideretur ut natus extendi ad affectum, sic perficitur ab habitu medio inter pure speculativum et practicum, qui complectitur utrumque; et hic habitus dicitur sapientia, quae simul dicit cognitionem et affectum. 'Sapientia enim doctrinae est secundum nomen eius', *Ecclesiastici* sexto (23). Unde hic est contemplationis gratia, et ut boni fiamus, principaliter tamen, ut boni fiamus⁷.

The human intellect is characterised by a pair of opposed terms: *speculativus-practicus*; and the main argument in favour of the speculative character of theology is based on that theology *dicit cognitionem* and is *contemplationis gratia*. Thus, *speculativus*, *cognitio* and *contemplatio* are perceived as having nearly the same meaning opposed to *practicus*, *opus* and *affectio*.

Almost identical understanding of *contemplatio* and *speculatio* can also be found in Alexander's of Hales *Summa theologica*:

Est certitudo speculationis et est certitudo experientiae; praeterea, est certitudo secundum intellectum et est certitudo secundum affectum (...). Dico ergo, quod modus theologicus est certior certitudine experientiae, certitudine quoad affectum (...), quamvis non certior quoad speculationem intellectus⁸.

Aliae scientiae procedunt ex principiis veritatis ut veritatis per se notis; haec autem scientia procedit ex principiis veritatis ut bonitatis et per se notis ut bonitatis, quamvis occultis ut veritatis. Unde haec scientia magis est virtutis quam artis et sapientia magis quam scientia, magis enim consistit in virtute et efficacia quam in contemplatione et notitia⁹.

Here, like in Bonaventure's text, *speculatio*, *intellectus*, *notitia*, *contemplatio* have meanings that are similar to each other and opposite to *experientia*, *affectus*, *virtus* and *efficacia*. Terms *contemplatio* and *speculatio* are used in a relatively broad, but clear and univocal sense.

⁷ Bonaventura, *Liber primus Sententiarum*, studio et cura pp. Collegii a S. Bonaventura, Quaracchi 1882, *Opera omnia*, t. I, prooem., q. 3, corp., p. 13b.

⁸ Alexander de Hales, *Summa theologica*, studio et cura pp. Collegii S. Bonaventurae, t. I, Quaracchi 1924, q. 1, cap. 4, a. 2, corp., p. 9a.

⁹ *Ibid*, I, q. 1, cap. 4, a. 2, ad 2, p. 9b.

Speculativus as well as *contemplativus* relate to the realm of pure cognition, free from any engagement in practical actions.

Seemingly, there is a similar situation in Thomas Aquinas' *Commentary to the Sentences*. However, considerations in which Aquinas employs terms *contemplativus* and *speculativus* are more complex than those proposed by Bonaventure and Alexander, although they treat the same subject, i.e. the nature of theology¹⁰. Thomas begins with the distinction of two meanings of *contemplatio*: First, it means the cognition of the created things that culminates in the cognition of God. In fact, it is the philosophical contemplation as described by Aristotle; it constitutes the ultimate goal (or felicity) of man's earthly existence. Second, *contemplatio* means the supernatural cognition of God that is accessible to human beings only thanks to God's grace in heavens¹¹. Then, Aquinas assumes that the ultimate goal determines the nature of science. Hence, if contemplation is the ultimate goal of theology, theology is a speculative science. He acknowledges, of course, that theology contains practical teaching and aims at virtuous actions, but these elements are subject to the heavenly contemplation of the First Truth¹².

¹⁰ It is absolutely not accidental that most fragments analysed in my paper derive from metatheological prologues to the great syntheses of scholastic theology because in these texts the interference of two languages appears. 13th century scholastics were trying to grasp purely theological problems, the heritage of the Church Fathers and earlier medieval theologians, that had been formulated in a rather religious not scientific terminology. Its part was specific use of the term *contemplatio*. But they were trying to do it by means of newly rediscovered and translated Aristotle's texts concerning gnoseology where the term *speculatio* played an important role and was nearly identified with *contemplatio*.

¹¹ Thomas de Aquino, *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum*, R.P. MANDONNET (CUR.), Parisiis 1929, t. I, prol., q. 1, a. 1, corp., (t. I, pp. 7-8): «Omnes, qui recte senserunt, posuerunt finem humanae vitae Dei contemplationem. Contemplatio autem Dei est duplex, una per creaturas, quae imperfecta est ratione iam dicta, in qua contemplatione Philosophus X *Ethicorum* felicitatem contemplativam posuit, quae tamen est felicitas viae; et ad hanc ordinatur tota cognitio philosophica, quae ex rationibus creaturarum procedit. Est alia Dei contemplatio, qua videtur immediate per suam essentiam; et haec perfecta est, quae erit in patria et est homini possibilis secundum fidei suppositionem. Unde oportet, ut ea, quae sunt ad finem, proportionentur fini, quatenus homo manducatur ad illam contemplationem in statu viae per cognitionem non a creaturis sumptam, sed immediate ex divino lumine inspiratam; et haec est doctrina theologiae».

¹² *Ibid.*, I, prol., q. 1, a. 3, corp. (t. I, p. 12): «Ista scientia, quamvis sit una, tamen perfecta est et sufficiens ad omnem humanam perfectionem propter efficaciam divini luminis (...). Unde perficit hominem et in operatione recta et quantum ad contemplationem veritatis. Unde quantum ad quid practica est et etiam speculativa. Sed quia scientia omnis

The final conclusion of Thomas' theory poses an essential difficulty: It was, indeed, commonly accepted by medieval thinkers (as demonstrated in the analysis of Alexander's and Bonaventure's texts) that the natural, philosophical contemplation or speculation is opposed to any practical action; nevertheless, the same can not be said about the supernatural contemplation accessible by the blessed in heavens. According to the majority of medieval thinkers, the two kinds of contemplation differ significantly; especially, contemplation understood as *visio beatifica* involves some practical elements: first of all, love to God is a practical affection. Therefore, the speculative nature of the supernatural contemplation can not be deduced from the non-practical or speculative character of the natural contemplation.

The contrary was assumed by Thomas. I suppose that he realised this difficulty, and consequently he abandoned this argumentation in favour of the speculative character of theology in his later works. In his *Summa theologiae* he bases the speculative nature of theology on its object instead of its goal¹³. Nevertheless, the problem how to differentiate both kinds of contemplation and how to express this distinction in the scholastic vocabulary remained.

principaliter pensanda est ex fine, finis autem ultimus istius doctrinae est contemplatio primae veritatis in patria, ideo principaliter speculativa est».

Ibid., I, prol., q. 1, a. 3, ad 1 (t. I, pp. 12-13): «Opus non est ultimum intentum in hac scientia, immo potius contemplatio primae veritatis in patria, ad quam depurati ex bonis operibus pervenimus, sicut dicitur *Matthaei* (5, 8) 'beati mundo corde', et ideo principalis est speculativa quam practica».

¹³ Thomas de Aquino, *Summa theologiae*, cura et studio Instituti Studiorum Mediaevalium Ottaviensis, Ottawa 1953, Pars I, q. 1, a. 4, corp., p. 4a-b.

Thomas' argumentation from his *Commentary to the Sentences* was taken up by Henry of Ghent (Henricus de Gandavo, *Summa quaestionum ordinariorum*, Parisiis 1521, a. 8, q. 3, ff. 65R-66Z). He also argued that theology is speculative because its ultimate goal is speculation. Unlike Aquinas, he rarely uses the term *contemplatio*, it appears almost only in quotations; instead he employs *speculatio*, but - what is striking - in the sense of not exclusively cognitive union with God, involving acts of will: «Est enim duplex bonum voluntatis. Unum, quod ab ipsa voluntate perficitur, ut est actio bona, quam in aliud extra se extendit, sicut est quaelibet actio directa in finem. Aliud vero, quod ipsam voluntatem perficit, ut est operatio perfecta, quam intra se elicit, et per quam fini ultimo se unit. Primum bonum voluntatis pertinet ad scientiam practicam, quia in ipsa est speculatio, ut actionem dirigat, quod proprium practicae est. Secundum vero bonum voluntatis pertinet ad scientiam specialiter speculativam, quia in ipsa est speculatio solummodo, ut voluntati obiectum suae operationis perfecte ostendat, ut in ipsum statim operatione perfecta tendat, quod est proprium speculativae supremae, quae cognitionem extendit in amorem» (f. 65Y).

One of the most systematic attempt to elucidate the difference between natural versus supernatural contemplation was made by a Franciscan theologian, Gonsalvus the Spanish. He enumerates three items in which the theological contemplation differs from the philosophical one: First, the theological contemplation aims at the inflammation of affection, while the philosophical one is concentrated on subtle, intellectual inquiry. Consequently, the main goal of the theological contemplation is devotion, not inquiry. On the contrary, the main goal of the philosophical contemplation is inquiry, not devotion. From this it follows that the theological contemplation can be attained by common, even uneducated people, whereas the philosophical one can be accomplished exclusively by the intellectually skilled and educated men¹⁴. Second, they differ because of their objects: theology deals with particular or singular things, while philosophy considers universals¹⁵. Third, the intensity of the theological contemplation makes human beings perform certain actions, whereas the philosophical one rather dissuades from any activity¹⁶.

Gonsalvus ends his reasoning with a very significant phrase:

¹⁴ Gonsalvus Hispanus, *Quaestiones disputatae et de Quodlibet*, L. AMORÓS (ed.), Quaracchi 1935, Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi, t. 9, q. 5. *Utrum laudare Deum mentaliter sit actus intellectus practici*, pp. 69-86., p. 79: «Triplex differt contemplatio theologiae a contemplatione philosophiae: Quia contemplatio theologiae ordinatur ad inflammationem affectus, et non ad subtilem considerationem vel investigationem consideratorum. Econverso est de contemplatione philosophiae, quae ordinatur ad subtilem inquisitionem et considerationem consideratorum, et non ad inflammationem affectus. Ex quo correlarie sequuntur duae differentiae: primo, quod in contemplatione theologiae quaeritur devotio et non subtilis investigatio; econverso vero in contemplatione philosophiae quaeritur subtilis investigatio et non devotio. Secunda, quia contemplatio theologiae est communis omnibus, rudibus et subtilibus, instructis et non instructis; sed contemplatio philosophiae solum est communis instructis et subtilibus».

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 79: «Secunda differentia principalis est, quod contemplatio theologiae est circa singularia. Unde dicebat Apostolus (*I Cor.*, 2, 2): 'Non iudicavi me aliquid scire inter vos nisi Iesum Christum, et hunc crucifixum'; sed contemplatio philosophiae versatur circa universalia».

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 80: «Tertia differentia est, quia contemplatio theologiae quanto perfectior, tanto plus inclinatur et ordinatur hominem ad agendum; non sic autem contemplatio philosophiae. Unde in hoc conveniunt activum et contemplativum theologiae, quod utrumque inclinatur ad devotionem et actionem; sed differunt, quod contemplativum est circa interiora, sed activum circa exteriora».

Contemplativum theologiae continetur sub practico philosophiae, quia theologia tantum est practica¹⁷.

He states here that the contemplative part of theology, which is related to the supernatural, corresponds to the practical element of the natural knowledge. Therefore, it should be described as practical. Furthermore, we can draw an additional conclusion that was not formulated by Gonsalvus himself. Since the speculative and practical exclude each other, the theological contemplation is not speculative in the strict philosophical, i.e. Aristotelian sense.

The last step in distinguishing two kinds of contemplation, which consisted in naming the theological contemplation *contemplatio* and the philosophical one *speculatio*, was done by other Franciscan authors. Let us consider fragments from the works of John of Pecham, Peter of Falco, William of Ware and John of Bassolis¹⁸.

John of Pecham considers the following argument proving the speculative character of theology: Philosophers divide human sciences into practical and speculative and theologians divide them into contemplative and active. These two distinctions are parallel to each other and since the contemplative part, because of its nobility, prevails over the active one in theology, theology is a speculative science¹⁹.

It is evident that the similarity of *speculatio* and *contemplatio* constitutes the basis of this argument. Therefore, the easiest way to refute it is to deny their synonymy. It is exactly Pecham wrote:

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 80.

¹⁸ The first two enumerated theologians had written their texts before Gonsalvus formulated his distinction of contemplations, hence, they could not base their reasoning on his arguments. I decided to analyse Gonsalvus' theses first because I was anxious to disclose the logical structure of the discourse, not to follow strictly the chronological order of the appearance of particular works.

¹⁹ Ioannes Pecham, *Commentarius in primum librum Sententiarum* (Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale: conv. soppr. G 4 854), prol., pars 2, q. 2, a. 2, 4, f. 4vb, see also, L. AMORÓS, «La teología como ciencia práctica...», p. 282: «Philosophi dividunt studium humanum per speculativam et practicam sicut christiani per contemplativam et activam; sed theologia principalius est contemplativa, ergo principalius est speculativa. Minor probatur: quia contemplativa est simpliciter nobilior, sed omne nobilior est huic scientiae simpliciter tribuendum».

Non est eadem divisio speculativae et practicae, quae est per contemplativam et activam. Contemplativa vero est, quae principaliter exercitium habet erga verum ut bonum desiderabile, scilicet Deum, activa vero, quae exercet se principaliter in operibus pietatis ad proximum propter Deum, et ita tam activa, quam contemplativa circa virtutis perfectionem negotiatur. Non sic est de speculativa et practica, quoniam speculativa considerat illa, quae ad operationem non ordinantur principaliter²⁰.

Pecham demonstrates the difference between *contemplatio* and *speculatio* pointing out the practical element involved in contemplation. Namely, he takes into account the good desired by human beings, i.e. God, whereas *speculatio* is limited to cognitive acts that exclude anything involving actions.

A similar thesis can also be found in Peter's of Falco Question 1 from his *Disputed Questions*. In its *respondeo*, he analyses the position arguing that theology is a speculative science because its ultimate goal is speculation. Probably, Henry of Ghent is meant here²¹. Peter begins with the dichotomy of speculation into speculation understood as a purely cognitive act and speculation completed by love that according to him should be strictly named *contemplatio*.

Speculatio potest accipi dupliciter: uno modo, ut dicit puram cognitionem; alio modo, ut habet annexam dilectionem, et sic proprie dicitur contemplatio²².

Peter uses this distinction as a premise for the correct interpretation of *authoritates* taken from Augustinus' works which say that speculation (or contemplation) is the ultimate goal of human beings²³. Unlike Henry of Ghent, Peter argues that Augustinus meant speculation as completed by the love of God, thus, strictly as contemplation. Hence, Augustinus' *authoritates* can not be used as a premise for the speculative character of theology²⁴.

²⁰ Ibid., pars 2, q. 2, a. 2, ad 4, f. 5rb (AMORÓS, s. 283-284).

²¹ For Henry of Ghent see note 13.

²² Petrus de Falco, *Questions disputées ordinaires. Tome I*, A.-J. GONDRAZ (ed.), Louvain-Paris 1968, *Analecta Mediaevalia Namurcensia*, t. 22, q. 1. *Quaeritur utrum scientia legis divinae sit practica vel speculativa*, pp. 29-70, p. 45.

²³ Augustinus, *De Trinitate libri XV*, W.J. MOUNTAIN (ed.), Turnholti 1968, *Corpus Christianorum*, t. 50, I, 10, 20, p. 56; *Sermo 88 De Iacob et Esau*, 5, 5 (PL 38, 542).

²⁴ Petrus de Falco, *Questions disputées ordinaires*, p. 47: «Sed advertas, quod speculatio, si est virtuosa, ordinatur ad dilectionem; unde Augustinus in *Sermone assumptionis Mariae* (104, c. 2., n. 3, PL 38, 617), comparans vitam contemplativam

The most detailed and developed analysis of the proper meaning of 'contemplation' was presented by William of Ware in Questions 1 and 4 of the Prologue to his *Commentary to the Sentences*. Like his intellectual Franciscan predecessors, William criticises the followers of the speculative nature of theology, who argue that the ultimate goal of theology is speculation. William, on the contrary, points out that *visio Dei* is not an act of pure speculation since it is subject to the love of God. Nevertheless, the notion of contemplation plays in his considerations a crucial role because he contends that theology is a contemplative science. The term *contemplatio* is used as an opposite of *praxis* and *speculatio*.

VIII *Civitas*, capitulo 3: 'Omne studium sapientiale vel in contemplatione, vel actione versatur'. Unde una pars eius activa, altera contemplativa dici potest, ut supra. Cum ergo haec scientia nec sit speculativa proprie, nec practica proprie, nec simul practica et speculativa, nec etiam affectiva, ut probatum est, erit contemplativa. Et huius ratio est, quia licet pro tanto possit dici practica, quia dilectionem habet pro fine ultimo extra, quae est circa proximum, et illa dilectio est aliquid operatum a nobis, quia tamen haec dilectio finaliter est propter dilectionem Dei, respectu cuius dicitur ista scientia contemplativa ab Augustino, ut supra patet, debet dici simpliciter contemplativa, non obstante, quod extendatur ad talem amorem Dei²⁵.

William's thesis seems to be a mere mechanical adaptation of Augustinus' *auctoritas* claiming that any science must deal with actions or contemplation. This statement allows the Franciscan master to avoid describing theology by means of Aristotelian dichotomy of sciences into practical and speculative. Thus, William is able to refute series of various difficulties excluding practical or speculative character of theology. Such a solution of the problem can be easily objected, as was shown in the first paragraph of this paper, if the proper meaning of the term *contemplatio* is not openly stated and its relations to other terms, like *speculatio* and *praxis*, are not specified.

William does it in Question 1 of his Prologue, which treats the goal of theology. His analysis of the goal of theology is based on the parallelism

activae, dicit, quod 'transit labor multitudinis, sed remanet caritas unitatis'; unde dignitatem contemplativae attribuit dilectioni. Unde speculatio non dicit hic puram cognitionem, sed habet annexam dilectionem, aliter esset curiosa et Augustinus contradiceret sibi ipsi, immo et Deo».

²⁵ Guilelmus de Ware, *Quaestiones in libros Sententiarum*, prol., q. 4, corp., f. 6r; see also, L. AMORÓS, *La teología como ciencia práctica*, p. 301. For Augustinus see note 2.

between theology and prudence. According to Aristotle, man becomes morally perfect, and consequently, happy because of virtues. But these virtues must be directed and supervised by one virtue that can be reduced neither to pure theory nor to actions of fortitude, temperance or justice. This virtue is prudence and its goal is the truth harmonised with the right striving. In analogy, theology is a kind of virtue that guides to the eminent, makes believe to the truth and love the good; and it can be named supernatural prudence. Its goal can be described neither as pure cognition nor as an act of any of the theological virtues since it is to cognise the truth that is harmonised with the supernatural striving for the supernatural good, i.e. God²⁶.

²⁶ Ibid., prolog., q. 1, corp., f. 2r: «Ideo dico, quod finis istius scientiae tantum est unicus, per se dico {dico *om.* N} et proprius, et non dilectio boni nec cognitio veri ut stans in nuda cognitione, sed cognitio veri ut confesse, hoc est concorditer sive consonanter, se habens appetitui recto tendenti in bonum supernaturale divinum modo supernaturali. Imaginor igitur sic, ut {ut} L quod N} sicut homo in esse naturali constitutus existens felix naturaliter sive moraliter et sic dispositus per virtutes morales sive cardinales requirit unum habitum regulativum sive directivum circa mores et actiones earum, qui habitus potest dici prudentia naturalis, quae potest dici particularis sive universalis, cuius finis per se et proprius non est speculatio nuda veri nec actus fortitudinis, temperantiae vel iustitiae, sed veritas confesse se habens appetitui recto, secundum Philosophum VI *Ethicorum*, 2 capitulo (1139a 29-31), quod non videtur esse nisi quaedam directio naturalis circa illas virtutes.

Sic imaginor ex parte ista, quod constitutus in esse supernaturali tribus virtutibus theologicis: fide, spe et caritate, <requirit> {N} L requirunt} unum habitum regulantem et dirigentem ipsum circa credulitatem respectu veri et circa elevationem mentis respectu ardui, et circa dilectionem communem gratuitam respectu boni, hoc est circa credenda, speranda et diligenda. Augustinus *Soliloquiorum* in principio (I, 1, 3): 'Fides nos excitat, spes erigit, caritas iungit'. Qui habitus non est aliud nisi quaedam ethica prudentia supernaturalis, cuius finis non est nuda speculatio veri, per se dico et principaliter, nec actus aliquis fidei, spei vel caritatis, sed cognitio veri confesse se habens appetitui recto in esse supernaturali constituto, quod non videtur esse nisi quaedam directio supernaturalis circa illas virtutes, sicut ex alia parte naturalis directio circa alias virtutes. Et sic theologia vel scientia theologiae non est nisi quaedam ethica prudentia supernaturalis, quae est, ut per eam homo sciat melius se habere ac dirigere circa credenda, speranda et diligenda; et quia duo praecedentia, scilicet credere et sperare, sunt per se propter dilectionem communem, ideo ista scientia principaliter est, ut dirigat et modum debitum dilectioni imponat. Et sic est propter talem dilectionem circa dilectionem et beatitudinem ut propter finem proprium et principalem intra, et propter dilectionem sicut propter finem extra principalem.

Et ideo dico, quod sicut scientia moralis non est nisi quaedam prudentia naturalis communis, quasi naturalem et particularem perficiens, quae est, ut dirigat hominem circa actus virtutum moralium, ut sic possit se et actus suos dirigere et ordinare in felicitatem

Thus, theology can not be adequately described as practical or speculative because each of these predicaments taken separately overlooks some essential elements of theology. Hence, William decided to use a different term suggested to him by Augustinus, namely contemplative. *Contemplatio* means here, like in John's of Pecham and Peter's of Falco works, something that combines features of the pure speculation with those of practical actions; but both must be related to the supernatural, i.e. God.

The last author mentioned in this paper is John of Bassolis. Like all his Franciscan predecessors, he objects the argument for the speculative nature of theology based on speculation being its main goal²⁷. John neglects simply the identity of the philosophical speculation with the theological contemplation, because the second one contains necessarily something practical:

Dilectio Dei est principalis in vita contemplativa nostra, quia sic narraverunt philosophi; et non obstante hoc est verissime praxis; nec idem dicunt sancti vitam contemplativam, quod dixerunt philosophi vitam speculativam²⁸.

This fragment of John's work proves the persistence of the non-synonymy of *contemplatio* and *speculatio* in the Franciscan theology later in the 14th century just in the form that was stated in the 13th century.

illam naturalem, quam ponebant philosophi, quae fuit finis extra illius scientiae, sic scientia nostra moralis supernaturalis, scilicet theologia non est nisi quaedam perfecta prudentia supernaturalis, quae est, ut homo se dirigat circa actus virtutum theologiarum, ut sic possit se et actus suos dirigere et ordinare in beatitudinem supernaturalem, quam nos christiani exspectamus, qui est finis extra istius scientiae, sicut alia beatitudo naturalis finis alterius scientiae. Et credo, quod illum finem intendit quilibet <christianus> {*add. N*}, qui debito modo audit theologiam; et, ut illud directivum habeatur, fiunt disputationes, praedicationes et talia. Et qui plus habet de isto directione, est melior theologus. Et ex isto sequitur, quod ista scientia nec est proprie speculativa, nec practica, nec affectiva, sed alio nomine magis proprie debet vocari, ut infra patebit».

²⁷ Ioannes de Bassolis, *Commentarius in quattuor libros Sententiarum*, Parisiis 1516, prol., q. 8, a. 1, f. 32rb: «<Amor Dei> est principalis [sed], in quo consistit vita contemplativa secundum Isidorum III (*Differentiae*, 34, 130 (PL 83, 90C); *Sententiae*, III, 15 (PL 83, 689C-691C)) et Gregorium *Super Ezechielem* (1, 10, 14 (PL 77, 891)), igitur non est praxis, saltem eo modo, quod philosophi acceperunt praxim».

²⁸ *Ibid.*, prol., q. 8, a. 1, f. 32rb.

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This paper traces a process of emerging of the meanings of the notions that were important for the intellectual life in Middle Ages, namely *speculatio* and *contemplatio*. I have tried to point out one particular moment in this process: the impact of philosophical, i.e. strictly Aristotelian understanding of *contemplatio*, that makes it almost identical with *speculatio* (a purely cognitive act); and the reaction to such a change of meaning by authors who defended the traditional, taken from the Church Fathers and 12th century theologians, sense of *contemplatio*: taken as the most noble union of man and God, making man happy. However, such a form of union with God may have different aspects. One of them is an assumption that human beings are able to have perfect knowledge of God; another is an assumption of moral perfection and affective communion with God. These two elements - also according to Aristotle - are practical, therefore *contemplatio* must be distinguished from *speculatio* and to some degree even opposed to it. This distinction was worked out by the series of Franciscan theologians as an element in their combating the partisans of the speculative nature of theology.

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